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Washington, D. C.
The professions today are afflicted with a species of moral
.alaise that may prove fatal to their moral identities and perilous to
our whole society as well. This malaise is manifest in a growing
conviction even among conscientious doctors, lawyers and
ministers that it is no longer possible to practice their professions
within traditional ethical constraints. More specifically, the belief is
taking hold that unless he looks out for his own self-interest, the
professional will be crushed by the forces of commercialization,
competition, government regulations, malpractice, advertising,
public and media hostility and a host of other inimical socioeconomic forces.
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the selfinterest of the professional justifies the compromises in, and even
the rejection of, obligations imposed by traditional concepts of
professional ethics.
I take strong exception to this line of reasoning both in its
foundations and in its conclusions. I argue to the contrary: 1) that
what deficiencies there are in professional morality are, as they
have always been, deficiencies in character and virtue, 2) that a
firm philosophical foundation exists for altruism and fidelity to trust
in the ethics of the professions, 3) that professional ethics must at
times be independent of conventional morality, and 4) that the
professions are moral communities with enormous moral power
which, properly used, can sustain the moral integrity of the
practitioner and the professions. Moreover, if they use their moral
power well, the professions can become paradigms of disinterested service that can raise the level of conventional morality.
This is an ambitious set of assertions. To speak of character and
virtue in today's moral climate is to be suspected of sancti'Tloniousness or hypocrisy. We must admit that the concepts of
rtue and character are two of the oldest and slipperiest in moral
philosophy. Also, the proper place of self-interest in virtue ethics
has never been sati~factorily settled. Finally, we still lack a
coherent moral philosophy of the professions in which to locate
the concepts of character, altruism and self-interest and to define

the relationships between them . These difficulties notwithstanding, we cannot avoid engagement with what I take to be the
central crisis in the professions today-the confusion about who
and what we are, and what we should be.
Each of our professions has its own list of morally questionable
practices that its members would justify on the grounds of
threatened self-interest. All such practices have three features in
common: First, they are based on the use of privilege and power
for the personal gain of the professional. Second, they reflect a
failure to take certain risks required for the well-being of those
whom the profession serves. Finally, in the case of both of these
features, justification is sought on the grounds of legitimate selfinterest. It is my conviction that these practices and the justification
sought for them derive from the de-emphasis on character and
virtue in the three professions we are examining.
In what follows, I examine three questions about the current
moral malaise of the professions: 1) What are the reasons for the
erosion of virtue ethics and the moral legitimation of self-interest in
the ethics of the professions? 2) Is there a philosophical basis for
restoring virtue ethics to the professions? 3) What are the practical
and theoretical implications of such a return of virtue ethics?
Despite numerous efforts since then, no one has improved on
Aristotle's imperfect, but still useful, definition of virtue. Aristotle
identifies moral virtues as states of character, by which he means
" ... the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with
reference to the passions."(1) Virtue is a particular state of
character, one which" ... both brings into good condition the thing of
which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done
well."(2) And further, "the virtue of a man also will be the state of
character which makes a man good and which makes him do his
work well."(3)
By "ethics ofthe professions", I do not mean the norms actually
followed by professionals, or the professional codes they
espouse, but rather the moral obligations deducible from the kinds
of activity in which they are engaged. The ethics of the profes-

sions, therefore, consists in a rational and systematic ordering of
the principles, rules, duties and virtues intrinsic to achieving the
ends to which a profession is dedicated. This is the "internal
morality" of a profession.(4)
"Self-interest", too, has several meanings. There is a legitimate
self-interest which pertains to the duties we owe to ourselvesduties which guard health, life, some measure of material wellbeing, the good of our families, friends, etc.(5)
Given the nature of professional relationships, some degree of
effacement of self-interest-which I shall take to mean the same
as beneficent altruism-is morally obligatory for health professionals.

What Accounts for the Erosion of
Virtue and the Rise of Self-interest?
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Let me turn now to the first of my three questions: What accounts
for the erosion of virtue ethics? I would select four factors: a) the
unresolved conceptual tension between virtue and self-interest,
b) the conceptual difficulties of virtue ethics itself, c) the modern
turn in ethics from the character of the moral agent to the
resolution of dilemmas, and d) the shift in economic and political
values in the last decade.
The tension between self-interest and virtue was recognized at
the beginning of western moral philosophy. Plato has Socrates
confront this dilemma in the Republic when Thrasymachus
asserts that "justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger."(6)
Glaucon for his part contends that man by nature pursues selfinterest and is deflected only by law-an idea also advanced by
other ethical "relativists" like Thucydides and Gorgias. Callicles
goes further and insists that virtue consists in acting selfishly and
tyranically. W. K. C. Guthrie shows how persistent the idea of
self-interest and self-love was in the thought of the Sophists.(7)
Aristotle too had difficulties with the reality of self-interest and its
reconciliation with his doctrine of moral virtue. He asks if one
should love one's self primarily, or one's neighbor.(8) At one point,
he tries to show, like so many philosophers after, that acting to
benefit others contributes to happiness and therefore is in one's
own self-interest.(9) But this is a weak argument because Aristotle
also asserts that the truly virtuous person ought to practice
altruism for its own sake.(10) In his interesting analysis of this
problem in Books VIII and IX of the Eudemian Ethics, EngbergPedersen concludes that Aristotle's position is that justice is the
basis of all the virtues. The virtuous person assigns no more of
natural goods to himself than to others. In this way he encompasses altruism, places restraints on inordinate self-interest and
serves legitimate self-interest.(11 )
Despite the unresolved difficulties of dealing with the reality of
self-interest, the ethics of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics placed the
emphasis squarely on virtues. Virtue ethics dominated classical
and Hellenistic moral philosophy. It came to its highest development in the moral philosophy of Aquinas who joined the supernatural to the natural virtues. Thus the classical and medieval
philosophies of virtue constituted a continuum.
This continuum centered on a conception ofthe virtuous person
as one who exhibited the traits of character essential to human
flourishing and to optimal fulfillment of the capabilities inherent in
human nature. For such a person, self-interest was recognized as
a responsibility but it was to be submerged to varying degrees by
noble acts in the interests of others. The good life called for a
rational balance between personal good and the good of
others.(12) Butthe cardinal virtues-temperance, justice, courage
and prudence-all implied some degree of effacement of selfinterest as a mark of the virtuous person. At a minimum the

virtuous person was not to take advantage of the vulnerability of
others. As examples: Socrates chose death to teach a moral
lesson to his fellow Athenians; Plato distinguished the art
making money from the art of healing;(13) Cicero admonishes t
corn merchant not to raise prices when the crop is small;(14)
Hippocrates makes beneficient concern for the welfare of his
patients the first principle of medical ethics.(15) Thus, while they
recognized the reality of self-interest, the ancient and medieval
moral philosophers held firmly to virtue as the touchstone of the
moral life.
In the post-medieval period two philosophical assaults were
launched on virtue ethics, one by Machiavelli and the other
by Thomas Hobbes. Both are conceptual descendants of
Thrasymachus, Callicles and the anti-virtue pre-Socratics. Both
replaced the optimistic view of human nature with moral
pessimism. Both found the traditional concepts of virtue antithetical to human nature and self-interest. Machiavelli simply
converted the traditional virtues into vices, while Hobbes psychologized them as a form of self-interest. The Machiavellian and
Hobbesian strains are the heart of today's moral malaise and
cynicism which seeks to give moral legitimacy to the professionals' self-interest.
Machiavelli (1469-1527) was too well-educated in classical
humanism to deny totally the value of virtue as an ideal in human
conduct. But his observation ofthe real world in which men livedin warfare, tyranny and political upheaval-convinced him that
there was no survival value in living virtuously. The good man
simply could not thrive in a world in which so many others were not
good.(16) And so Machiavelli advised the Prince who would be
successful to use whatever means would ensure his survival and
the continuance of his power. The classical cardinal virtues of
temperance, justice, even at times fortitude and prudence, coulrl
be impediments when dealing with those who ignored the
constraints on self-interest. In these circumstances the virtues
thus became vices. Moreover, on the Machiavellian view, virtue
itself became an instrumental notion, a power to effect a given end
rather than a behavioral ideal. Indeed, for Machiavelli virtue
became virtu, "manliness"-an expression of power rather than a
disposition to act well as it was understood in the classicalmedieval continuum.
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1773), a phYSician, went further than
Machiavelli in some ways. Not only did he think the virtues were
impractical, but he held them to be vices-destructive not only for
personal but social good. It is through greed, the desire for luxury,
pleasure, and power that society prospers and things get done.
The satisfaction of acquisitiveness, intemperance, and gluttony
makes for jobs, puts money into the economy and provides a
livelihood for many.(17) Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," whether
tongue-in-cheek or not, has been influential in encouraging an
anti-virtue bias which has always found supporters and has many
today.
Nietzsche's (1844-1900) anti-virtue stance was of a different kind but still in the Machiavellian spirit. For Nietzsche's
"ubermensch", the traditional virtues were meaningless. They
were simply impediments to the achievement of greatness. The
virtues were for lesser mortals. For the superman, virtues like
temperance or justice would be vices.(18)
A more modern exponent of a similar moral viewpoint is Ayn
Rand. Her ideas, though far less well-argued than those of
Machiavelli, Mandeville or Nietzsche, are a current compound of
all three. Rand's novels of the successful architect or industrialist
extol the "virtues" of individualism, ruthlessness, power, an
uninhibited pursuit of wealth and self-interest.(19) Her ideas havb
had a considerable influence on those who seek moral justification for their acquisitive instincts. In this regard it is interesting
to note that the slogan of Regardie's magazine is "money, power,
greed."

Moral Machiavellianism-whether in its original version or its
later varieties in Mandeville, Nietzsche, or Rand-is very much
ve today. We see it in the medical entrepreneurs who own
pitals or nursing homes, the lawyer-power broker who sells
I luence or leveraged buyouts, in the multi-million dollar
ministries. Indeed, all who hold that virtue simply does not pay and
that it is a fool's enterprise are moral Machiavellians.
Machiavelli made the virtues into vices. Thomas Hobbes (15881679), on the other hand, tried to maintain some idea of virtue
which was reconcilable with self-interest. His was a formal
philosophical break with the medieval tradition. His aim was to
establish ethics on purely naturalistic grounds, free of the
theological spirit that characterized the medieval synthesis. He
built his moral philosophy on a pessimistic view of human nature
that departed sharply from the essentially optimistic classicalmedieval view.
Aristotle opens his Politics by asserting that man is a social
animal. Man, Hobbes said, was unsocial by nature. He enters
society only to satisfy his mostfundamental urges. His selfishness
is primary and is expressed in a desire to preserve his own life,
enhance pleasure, avoid pain, and become secure from attack by
others. Hobbes does not make the virtues into vices, rather he puts
them at the service of self-interest. We pity others because we see
the possibility of being in the position of those we pity. We are
benevolent either because it gives us power or it will assure us
benevolence in return. "All society" he said, "is for gain or
glory."(20) We obey society's rules only because we feel if we do
not, others will threaten our security. On Hobbes' view, effacement
of self-interest is unnatural, because it makes us the victims of
others. Self-interest determines what is good and bad. But selfinterest alone will not secure a peaceable society. That must
fi ally be secured by an absolute sovereign, or society will be torn
rt by competing self-interests.
obbes' view on self-interest was coupled with a scorn for the
good which had been vital to classical and medieval philosophy. If
the good is reducible to what we like or dislike, as Hobbes
suggested, then virtues and vices are also matters of preference.
Hobbes' powerful assertions shaped much of English moral
philosophy. His successors tried either to rebut the primacy of
self-interest or reconcile it with some more altruistic principle.
John Locke (1632-1704), for example, agreed with Hobbes that
good and evil are determined by pain or pleasure or conformity to
some law. He did assert that we ought to help others but only if it
did not endanger our own self-interest. Shaftesbury (1671-1713)
tried hard to show that self-interest and service to others were
synonymous. Virtues, he said, "payoff" in self-interest because of
the pleasure we get from benevolent acts. The vices like anger,
intemperance, and covetousness, on the other hand, bring pain.
Shaftesbury thought that we ought to embrace virtue because we
have an obligation to protect self-interest, so that affection for
virtue is really affection for self-interest. Hutcheson (1694-1746)
developed Shaftesbury's moral-sense theory more fully, as did
Hume (1711-1776). They identified virtue as that which gives the
spectator of virtuous acts a feeling of approbation, while vicious
acts elicit disapproval. They took some of the bluntness out of
Hobbes' emphasis in self-interest. But they end up agreeing that
we have no ultimate obligation to virtue other than its bearing on
our self-interest or happiness. Adam Smith (1723-1790), too,
holds that virtues are those traits of character that are useful or
agreeable to the moral sentiment of the agent or others. Bentham
(1748-1832) argued that whatever is conducive to the general
f,>piness always conduces to the happiness of the agent. In this
y his utilitarianism reconciles self-regarding and otherregarding interests by subsuming all of these interests under the
principle of greatest happiness. J. S. Mill (1806-1873) went further
than Bentham positing that the greatest good of all is the source of
one's own happiness. One's own self-interest, therefore, is best

l

,ni

served by acting for the good of all. On this view, consciously
doing without happiness to achieve the greatest good of all is
paradoxically a source of happiness.(21 )
In contrast with the moral sentiment, theorists and the utilitarians, the Cambridge intuitionists like Cudworth (1617-1688),
Henry More (1614-1687), and Cumberland (1631-1718) tried to
show that there were reasons for virtuous acts even if they
conflicted with self-interest. More even postulated a "Boniform
faculty", a virtue that gives us mastery over our baser impulses to
serve selfish interests first.(22)
Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) took issue with both
Shaftesbury and Hobbes. Neither self-love nor benevolence were
the only affections involved in human behavior. Altruism and
self-interest do not completely exclude other desires and motivations. Nor are benevolence and self-interest mutually exclusive.
Man has a conscience which enables him to order his passions so
that he can do what is good not just for self. By conscience man
can know how much benevolence will advance and how much will
damage his self-interest. Butler was a cleric and looked to God to
implant conscience in humans to point out what action is most in
conformity with human nature. Thus conscience enables us t6
know that some things are inherently good and some inherently
bad. Butler thus invoked theology implicitly if not always explicitly,
though he tried, as did Hobbes, to extract his moral philosophy
from reason.(23)
Enough has been said to demonstrate how the question of
altruism and self-intetest arose in Hobbes and Machiavelli and
established two powerful strains of thought with which moral
philosophy has been occupied ever since. As I pointed out earlier,
the problem arose in ancient philosophy as well. In Christian moral
philosophy as enunciated by Aquinas, self-preservation was built
into natural law. What is owed to self and what is owed to others
was ordered by the virtue of charity. Indeed, it may be that this is
the only way in which the inherent tensions between self-interest
and altruism can ever be finally resolved.
These tensions certainly have not been resolved in twentieth
century moral philosophy. The subjectivism and emotivism of
Ayer, the prescriptivism of Hare, the existentialism of Sartre-all
make moral judgment matters of approval or disapproval, preference, or self-determination. The metaethical emphasis on
language and logic of moral discourse rather than the content of
moral judgments further weakened the classical notions of virtue
so that the definition of virtue has become either so vague as to be
meaningless or so encompassing as to include every conceivable
likable trait.(24)
Twentieth-century moralists have refined the eighteenthcentury notion of moral sentiment and further psychologized
ethics. In the light of the psychologies of Freud orthe behaviorism
of Watson or Skinner, today many moralists look to modern
psychology to define the virtues and to close the gap between
knowing the good and being motivated to do the good. Others look
to genetics, culture or social organization to explain altruism and
self-interest.(25) Nagel, on the other hand, presents a Kantian
challenge to this trend and argues for the rationality of altruism. In
doing so, he rejects the Humean subordination of reason to desire
or emotion.(26) Philippa Foot tried unsuccessfully to link virtue and
self-interest in her work Virtues and Vices.
The disarray of normative ethics, including the destruction of
virtue ethics, has occasioned a spate of recent attempts to
resuscitate the classical and especially the Aristotelian idea of
virtue. This move was initiated by Anscombe(27) and
Maclntyre.(28) Their success varies, and the extent to which they
can reverse the dominance of self-interest in ethics begun by
Hobbes is highly problematic.
The second major factor in the erosion of virtue ethics is the
philosophical difficulty inherent in the concept of virtue itself. First,
is its lack of specificity. Virtue ethics does not tell us how to resolve
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specific moral dilemmas. It de-emphasizes principles, rules,
duties and concrete prescriptions. It only says that the virtuous
person will be disposed to act in accord with the virtue appropriate
to the situation. This lack of specificity leads to a distressing
circularity in reasoning. The right and the good is that which the
virtuous person would do, and the virtuous person is one who
would do the right and the good. We must define either the right
and the good or the virtuous person if we are to break out of this
logical impasse.
Furthermore, virtue theory cannot stand apart from some theory
of human nature and the good. The more vague our definitions of
human nature and its telos, the more difficult it is to keep virtue
from becoming vice and vice virtue. Since virtue ethics puts its
emphasis on the character of the agent, it requires a consistent
philosophical anthropology, otherwise, it easily becomes subjectivist, emotivist, relativist and self-destructive.
Further difficulties include the relations of intent to outward
behavior. Is good intention a criterion of a virtuous person? How
do we determine intention? Can a good intention absolve the
agent of responsibility for an act which ends in harm-a physician
telling a patient the truth out of the virtue of honesty, and thereby
precipitating a serious depression or even suicide? Few are
virtuous all the time. How many lapses move us from the virtuous
to the continent, incontinent, or vicious category? How does virtue
ethics connect with duty- and principle-based ethics which give
the objectivity virtue ethics seems to lack?
Classical ethics in the East and the West have usually
eschewed systems of rules or principles or at least subordinated
them to the notion of moral character. Where do virtue and
supererogation meet? Are virtues synonymous with duties? Is
supererogation merely a higher degree of virtue? Why are some
people virtuous and others not? Must we turn to sociobiology for
the answer as some suggest?(29) Are virtues genetically
ingrained, mere survival mechanisms designed to propagate the
gene pool?
In spite of its ancient lineage, these fundamental questions are
yet to be answered. Because they have not been answered to
everyone's satisfaction, moralists have turned to something more
probable-to the question, what shall I do? How do I solve this
dilemma before me now?
This brings me to the third point I want to mention with regard to
the erosion of virtue ethics, namely the turn-particularly in
professional ethics-toward quandary and dilemma solving. This
is the result of a number of factors operating in the last two
decades. One is the concreteness and urgency of the new ethical
issues arising in scientific advance and socio-political change.
Medical and biological progress, for example, challenges traditional ethics. Yet these developments must be confronted without
the ethical compass points of a consensus on values or common
religious beliefs. We are now a morally heterogeneous society,
divided on the mostfundamental ethical issues, particularly about
the meaning of life and death. Without a common conception of
human nature we cannot agree on what constitutes a good life and
the virtues that oughtto characterize it. As a result, the ethics of the
professions, especially of the medical profession, has turned to
the analysis of dilemmas and of the process of ethical decisionmaking. For many, ethics consists primarily in a balancing of
rights, duties and prima facie principles and the resolution of
conflicts among them. Procedural ethics has replaced normative
ethics. This avoids the impasses generated when patients, clients
and professionals hold fundamentally opposing moral viewpoints.
But analysis cannot substitute for character and virtue even
though it provides conceptual clarity. Moral acts are the acts of
human agents. Their quality is determined by the characters of the
persons doing the analysis. Character shapes the way we define a
moral problem, selects what we think is an ethical issue, and
decides which principles, values and technical details are

determinative.
It makes a very great difference, therefore, whether a professional is motivated by self-interest or altruism. Given th
realities of professional relationships, the character of the pr
fessional cannot be eliminated from its central position and that is
why virtue ethics must be restored as the keystone of the ethics of
the professions.
A fourth and final factor eroding a virtue approach in the medical
profession is the legitimation in public attitude and tolerance of
self-interest. In response to the econom ic imperatives acting so
forcefully on the health care system, physicians and other
providers have been encouraged to compete with each other. The
availability, cost, and quality of health services have been turned
over increasingly to market forces. The Federal Trade Commission has classified the professions (yours and mine) as
businesses and made them subject to one ordering principle-the
preservation of competition.(30) Health providers have been
encouraged to become entrepreneurs, to invest in health-care
facilities and technologies, to be offered bonuses for keeping
utilization of health-care resources to a minimum. Without these
incentives, it is argued, the best will not enter medicine, or will retire
early. Medical progress would stop and new services would
cease to be available. For the first time in medical history, selfinterest has been given legal and moral legitimation, and profit has
been turned into a professional virtue. These trends are making
the physician into a businessman, an entrepreneur, a proletarian,
a gatekeeper, a bureaucrat. Never has there been more confusion
about who and what it is to be a physician.

II

Is There A Philosophical Basis for
Restoring Virtue Ethics?
This brings me to my second major question: Is there a sound
philosophical foundation in the nature of professional activity for
resolving the tension between altru ism and self-interest in favor of
virtue and character? I believe there is, and I would ground my
proposal in six characteristics of the relationship of professionals
with ·those who seek their help. Individually, none of these
ph Emonema is unique in kind or degree. They may exist
individually in other human relationships and occupations. But, as
a moral cluster, they are, in fact, unique and generate a kind of
"internal morality" -a grounding for the ethics of the professions
that is in some way impervious to vacillations in philosophical
fashions, as well as social, economic or political change. This
internal morality explains why the ethics of medicine, for example,
remained until two decades ago firmly rooted in the ethics of
character and virtue. This was true of the medical ethics of the
Hippocratic school and the Stoics. It is found in the seminal texts of
Moslem, Jewish and Christian medical moralists. It persisted in the
18th century in the writings of John Gregory, Thomas Percival and
Samuel Bard, who, although cognizant of the philosophies of
Hobbes, Adam Smith and Hume, nonetheless maintained the
traditional dedication of the profession tothe welfare of the patient
and to a certain set of virtues. Only in the last two decades has
there been (to use Hume's terms) a "sentiment of approbation"
regarding self-interest.
The first distinguishing characteristic of professional relationships is the dependence, vulnerability and eminent exploitability of
the person who seeks the help of a physician, lawyer d
clergyman. The person in need of help to restore health, receivb
justice or rectify his relationships with God is anxious, in distress
and driven by fear. To avoid death, damnation, or incarceration, he
is impelled to seek help, though he wishes he could avoid it. He is
not free to puruse life's other goals until help is forthcoming.

The second characteristic of professional relationships is their
inherent inequality. The professional possesses the knowledge
~ --·'."'-at the patient or client needs. This places the preponderance of
;wer in his hands. He can use it well or poorly, for good or evil, for
service or self-interest. How can we speak, as some do, of the
professional relationship as a "contract" when one party is so
dependent upon the other's services?
The third characteristic of professional relationships is their
special fiduciary character. In a state of vulnerability(31) and
inequality, we are forced to trust our physicians, lawyers or
ministers. We are ill equipped to evaluate their competence. We
are forced to reveal our intimate selves-baring our bodies, our
personal lives, our souls and our failings to another person who is
a stranger. Without these invasions of our privacy, we cannot be
healed or helped. Moreover, the professional invites our trust.
Professionals begin their relationship with us with the question:
How can I help you? Implicitly they are saying, "I have the
knowledge you need; trust me to have it and to use it in your best
interests." In the case of medicine, that promise is made in a public
oath atthe time of graduation when the graduate announces to all
present that, henceforth, he can be trusted to serve interests other
than his own. It is repeated in the codes of medicine and other
professions and the ordination rites of clergymen.
Indeed, it is this public declaration that defines a true "profession" and separates it from other occupations. The very word
comes from the Latin profiteri, to declare aloud, to accept publicly
a special way of life, one that promises that the profession can be
trusted to act in other than its own interest. Businessmen and
craftsmen ask to be trusted, but not at cost to themselves. Caveat
emptor can never be the first principle of a profession.
Fourth, the knowledge of true professionals, as I have just
(j ~E(fined them, cannot be wholly proprietary. Their knowledge is
~
ained to a practical end, to meeting certain fundamental
uman needs. Professional knowledge does not exist for its own
sake. This is clearest in medicine where society permits invasions
of privacy that would otherwise be criminal in order that physicians
may be trained. Thus, medical students, who are not fully skilled
are permitted to dissect human bodies, attend and assist at
autopsies and operations, and participate in the care of sick
people. They are allowed literally to practice, albeit under
supervision. Surgeons in training take many years to develop their
skills. Their first operations are hardly as proficient as those which
follow. Attending patients involves delays, diffusion of responsibility and accountability, and discomfort and even physical risk for
the patient. Society permits these invasions of privacy and the
risks attached to them, not primarily so physicians can make a
living but because society needs an uninterrupted supply of
doctors. Medical knowledge, and analogously, legal and clerical
knowledge, are held in trust for those who need them. They can
never be solely dispensed for the profit of the professional or on
terms unilaterally set by him or her. That is why lawyers are
officers ofthe court, and clergymen are ordained to minister in the
name of God or their churches.
The fifth feature of the professional relationship is that the
professional is the final common pathway through which help and
harm must pass. The final decisions, actions, and recommendations must be made by one person, the professional, with whom
the patient or client has a convenantal relationship of trust.
The sixth distinguishing characteristic feature of professional
relationships is that the professional is a member of a moral
community, that is, a collective human association whose
~
J embers share the privileges of special knowledge and together
-pledge their dedication to use it to advance health, justice or
salvation. Together the members of the moral community make
the same promises andelicitthe same trust they do as individuals.
They are bound by the same fidelity to the promise they have
collectively made and the trust they have collectively elicited. The

professional is, therefore, not a moral island. He belongs to a
group which has been given a monopoly on special knowledge
and holds it in trust for all who need it. Each professional is
responsible to his colleagues, and they are together responsible
for him. Collectively they are responsible for fidelity to the trust they
have solicited from society. This is what the privilege of selfregulation means-not that each professional is his own judge of
what is ethically permissible.
These features regarding human relationships are the components of the "internal morality" of the professions, the immediate
moral ground for their obligations, and the source of definition of
their virtues. To use Aristotle's terminology, those virtues make the
work of the professions "be well done."
The virtues of professional life are many, but I believe they are
reducible, primarily to two-fidelity to trust and beneficence, which
follows from the virtue of fidelity to trust. These two traits of
character are the ethical foundations upon which the other virtues
and principles of professional ethics depend. Clearly, they are
incompatible with the Machiavellian and Hobbesian doctrines of
self-interest. Their reality and irreducibility provide the most
powerful argument for the restoration of virtue ethics in professional morality.(32)

III

What Are the Practical
Implications of Virtue Ethics?
If there is validity in the philosophical foundations of professional morality as I have argued, a number of practical implications follow which are pertinent to healing the moral malaise and
confusion of today's professionals.
First, professionals cannot displace the moral failings of the
professions on others-on society, other professions, government, economics, the market place, etc. No one can make the
conscientious professional do what he thinks is not in the interests
of his patient or client. Can anyone force doctors to follow a policy
damaging to their interests? The fact that the professional is the
final common pathway for all policies and decisions and actions
forces him to be the guardian of the interests of his patient or client.
Indeed he invited that responsibility when he invited the patient or
client to trust him.
As a result, individual practitioners must be very careful in
exonerating themselves from morally dubious practices on the
basis of survival. Professional ethics will have no future only if it is
gradually suffocated by the moral compromises of individual
professionals. There will be times when, as guardians of the
patients' welfare, physicians will have a moral obligation to refuse:
they will refuse to "dump" the patient who cannot pay; they will
refuse to discharge the patient before he is ready; they will refuse
to act as society's fiscal agents; they will refuse to be seduced by
the profits of investments and ownership of health facilities or
bonuses for denying or delaying needed care; they will refuse to
be gatekeepers, exceptto protecttheir patients from unnecessary
medical interventions or procedures.(33) The physician of character will be the one who can reliably be expected to exhibit the
virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of self-interest.(34)
The second practical implication is that the individual professional must not be expected to stand by when the well-being of his
patient or client is threatened. It is an obligation of the professions
as moral communities to be advocates for those they serve and to
take collective action to assure that their services are available
and accessible to all, to protect those in need of healing, justice or
salvation against public legislation or institutional policies that may
harm them.
The professions as moral communities must also take the
responsibility for each member's ethical behavior seriously
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enough to monitor, discipline and even remove each other when
the canons of professional morality are violated. Think of the
enormous moral power the professions could exert if they were
truly the advocates of those they serve. Suppose that, in addition,
all the helping professions were to join their efforts. Could any
society resist? Can they do less? In the face ofthis power, can any
of the three great professions blame society for their own moral
lassitude?(35)
A third implication is that the formation of character is as
important in the education of professionals as their technical
education. Although this was a major concern of professional
education in the past, it has now been forsaken. People have
asked ever since Plato raised the question in the Meno: Can virtue
be taught? I believe it can. Obviously, the whole task of character
formation cannot be left to the professional schools. Families,
churches, and schools, all shape the character of students long
before they enter professional schools. But these schools must
also teach what it is to be a good physician, lawyer or clergymanwhat kind of person the good professional ought to be. Much can
be done in character formation when a student is motivated by his
desire to be a good professional even if his education prior to
medical, law school, or seminary was morally neutral or deficient.
The most effective instruments of character formation are the
professionals who teach in medical and law schools and
seminaries. But they must be able to demonstrate that competence and character are inseparable, and that fidelity to trust
and self-effacement can be, and must be, indispensable traits of
the authentic profession. Unfortunately not enough professional
school faculty members are convinced of this; nor are enough
morally equipped to serve as models of virtue.
Paradigm cases of ethically sensitive professionals drawn from
the history and tradition of each profession are also helpful. They
are more effective than is generally realized. One of the tragedies
of medical history is its depreciation of the lives of the great
physicians. While biographies may not have much fascination for
sophisticated medical historians, they still have inspirational value
for aspirants to medicine. Other professions have their morally
paradigmatic biographies as well. Most professional students
enter with some ideal of service in mind which the professional
school has a responsibility to reinforce.
A fourth implication is that cure of the moral malaise of the
professions requires something more than reordering the social
organization, or tailoring the semantic and semiotic feature of
professional codes as Kultgen rather naively supposes.(36) What
failings there are in the professions are failings in character and
not in the language of our codes. If character and virtue are
restored, the appropriate social reorganizations will follow-not
the other way around.
Finally, there are theoretical reasons as well for a restoration of
virtue, both in general and professional ethics. Happily a renaissance of interest among moral philosophers in this subject is very
much in evidence. But virtue ethics must not be seen as selfsufficient or as antithetical to principle- or duty-based systems of
the analysis of ethical dilemmas. The theoretical challenge is to
develop the logical connections between analytical and virtue
ethics, between principles and character, to close the gap
between cognition ofthe right and good and the motivation to do it,
and in the light of my whole discussion, to strike the morally
defensible balance between self-interest and its effacement
which recognizes the primacy of altruistic beneficence.
The theoretical challenges will be complicated because virtue
and duty-based ethics are today isolated from a more comprehensive moral philosophy which could tell us why we must be
moral and what we define as the moral life. We need to reconnect
ethics to some notion of the good and to a coherent philosophical
anthropology. To this end, it might be well to re-examine the
classical medieval synthesis before ethics was torn from its roots

in moral philosophy. That synthesis, amplified by our newer
knowledge of human nature, derived from the biological and
social sciences and reflected upon theologically, might provide
the new resuscitation that an effective virtue ethics demands.
For the time being, a reflection on the nature of professional
relationships can be fruitful even in the absence of a comprehensive moral philosophy of which it might be a part. The internal
morality of the professions based on the realities of professional
relationships is clear enough to help us repair the ozone hole
opened in the fabric of professional ethics, even if we cannot
repair the whole moral atmosphere on which our society depends
for its survival.
I have emphasized what I believe to be some of the elements
common to the moral philosophy of our three professions of
medicine, law and ministry. Many of these same features are
shared by other professions. I must leave them to decide how the
virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of self-interest apply to
them. Suppose all the professions were to acknowledge virtue as
a ground for moral accountability. Would this not be the leaven for
raising the standards of conventional morality as well?
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Minnesota Bioethics Retreat and Conference
by James Walters
Over an extended weekend last July,
thirty-five bioethicists from across the
country gathered at a resort in Minnesota
for a retreat. The purpose for the gathering was to allow an informal setting for
minimally structured discussion of substantive bioethical issues as well as
pedagogical and administrative matters.
The meeting was convened by Arthur
Caplan, director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of
Minnesota.
The setting was idyllic-the rolling hills
of Minnesota along Lake Superior. We
were housed in a large resort on the
bank of the lake with some of usparticularly those with accompanying
family members-having accommodations in surrounding lake cottages. Meals
were taken in the common resort dining
room. Although no formal papers were
read, there were participants who shared
reports (Peggy Battin of the University of
Utah had just returned from the Netherlands where she had studied the Dutch
policy of active euthanasia), ideas from
working papers (Bruce Jennings of the
Hastings Center shared some provocative ideas on the concept of democracy
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in health-care decision making), and
challenges (Daniel Wikler of the University of Wisconsin invited us to consider
involvement in bringing greater equity to
the distribution of health care in the
country). Although sessions started at
9 a.m. and some went informally past
midnight, there was ample time for
fellowship at meals and recreation at
periods during the day.
I must admit that the highlight in the
conference for me was an afternoon
canoeing trip in the "boundary waters"a large protected expanse of thousands
of finger lakes which dominate northern
Minnesota. A group of a dozen of us took
four canoes in a circular trip portaging
between a series of small pristine lakes.
The composition of the canoeing group
typified the delightful diversity of the
larger gathering: three philosophers,
three physicians, one ethicist, one attorney and three young people accompanying parents. (My daughter Wendy,
age 12, thoroughly enjoyed being
paddled through this natural paradise by
her dad and a pediatrician from
Wisconsin!)
Ethical issues in xenograft transplants
were among the topics discussed at the
"Fourth International Symposium on
Organ Procurement and Preservation"
held September 17-24 in Minneapolis.
George Annas of Boston University, Eric
Rose of Columbia Presbyterian Medical
Center, New York, and I gave presentations on the ethics of xenograft
transplantation.
George Annas, a professor of law and
a prolific writer on bioethical themes,
gave a brief history of xenograft transplantation and dwelt on the need for
regulation of emerging medical technologies. Annas drew on the Nuremberg
Code which gives guidelines for human
experimentation as a foundation for his
presentation. The law professor said his
plea for appropriate regulations was not
so much addressed to the medical
community as to fellow attorneys and
bioethicists. Further, he indicated that
transplant surgeons should push the

limits in performing their unique role ,
serving their patients. Government and
bioethics should produce appropriate
guidelines for protecting the larger good
of society, said Annas.
Eric Rose, a transplant surgeon who is
a leading advocate of xenograft transplantion, addressed medical aspects of
xenograft experimentation. A basic point
in Rose's lecture was that the primary
hurdle to any full-fledged program of
xenograft transplantation is the hyperacute humoral immune response which
increases as the species that are involved in the operation are more disparate. Rose has changed his focus from
operating procedures regarding higherlevel primates to addressing immunological rejection issues associated with
cross-species transplantation to humans
from goats and sheep.
I argued for a consistent ethic of all
sentient life-human life particularly, but
animal life more generally. I called for an
ethic which recognizes a hierarchy of
value dependent on an animal's capacity for intensity of experience by making
three specific points: First, xenografts
promise to be an undisputed good 1"
humanity. If animals could become tl
"spare parts" factories for humans,
potentially thousands of persons could
live better and longer. Second, xenografts are not the ideal answer because
of the sacrifice of primate lives. There is
something revolting in the idea of raising
primates in "farms" and "feeding lots" for
calculated death, I believe. Third, the
ideal answer to the transplant organ
shortage is use of dead persons-all
dead persons. In light of the history of
evolving definitions of death, I suggested
that we re-examine our current notion of
whole brain death and give further study
to the appropriateness of a neocortical
definition of death.
The chairman of the organizing committee was John S. Najarian, director of
transplantation atthe University of Minnesota Medical Center. Over 700 physicians from 32 countries attended the
conference, according to Najarian.
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